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IN THE 
Supreme Gourt of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
Recdrd No. 3664 
WILLiAM RUDOLPH ROSE, ROSALIND ROSE NEB~ 
LETT, F. M. NEBLETT AND GATEWOOD SIM~ 
MONS; AND MARY JANE ROSE .. SIMMONS, 
GEORGE PARHAM ROSE, NANCY MARGARET 
ROSE, ,RALPH LEE. DUNN, JR; MILTON DUNN, 
HOWARD WACHSMANN; JEAN WACHS}4ANN, 
MARVIN WACHSMANN AND MARGARET WACHS.: 
MANN, THE LAST NINE OF WHOM ARE IijF ANTS, 
BY KINSEY SPOTSWOOD, (}UARDIAN AD LITEM; 
AND KINSEY. SPOT-SWOOD, GUARDIAN AD 
LITEM FOR THE SAID INFANT DE-FEND.ANTS, 
Appellants; 
( .'· .-: 
versus 
!iIARY W; ROSE; OTTO W ACHSMANN; MARGARET F; 
· WACHSMANN, RALPH LEE DUNN,. THERESA 
DUNN; MADONNA JONES, JOHN JONES; RU.: 
DOLPH vVACHSM.ANN AND REBECCA WACHS.: 
MANN; Appellees~ 
. ' 
PETITION FOR APPEAU 
To the Honorabie Chief ;Justice and Justices of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
. . Your petitioners; Wiliiam: Rudoiph Rose, Rosiilitld Rose 
Neblett, F. M. Neblett and Gatewood Simmons, and Mary 
3' ane Rose Simmons, George Parham Rose, Nancy Mar-
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garet Rose, Ralph Lee Dunn, Jr., Milton Dunn, How-
ard Wachsman, Jean vVachsmann, Marvin vVachsmann and 
l\farg·aret W achsmann, the last nine of whom are inf ants by 
Kinsey Spotswood, their guardian ad litein, and Kinsey Spots-
wood guardian ad litem for the said infant defendants, re-
spectfully represent that they are aggrieved by a final decree 
of the Circuit Court of Sussex County, Virginia, entered on 
the 27th day of April, 1949, in a certain suit in chancery 
2* pending *in the said Court, in which your petitioner, Wil-
liam Rudolph Rose, was one of the complainants and 
your remaining pe~itioners were defendants, and Mary W. 
Rose was a complamant and Otto Wachsmann, Margaret F. 
W achsmann, Ralph Lee Dunn, Theresa. Dunn, Madonna Jones, 
John Jones, Rudolph Wachsmann and Rebecca Wachsmann 
were defendants. 
MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT. 
This suit was begun by the issuance of process returnable 
to second February Rules, 1949, and the bill of complaint was 
duly filed at those Rules. The primary 1·elief sought by the 
bill, insofar as this appeal is concerned, is the construction 
of a certain deed dated March 1, 1915, by which R. Wachs-
mann and Rebecca Wachsmann, liis wife, conveyed two tracts 
of land located in Sussex County, Virginia, to "Otto R. 
W achsmann ( the person named in this suit as '' Otto Wachs-
mann '') and his children and their children". The complain-
ant, Mary W. Rose, is one of four children of Otto Wachs-
mann, and the complainant, "'\Villiam Rudolph Rose, is one 
of five children of Mary W. Rose. The defendants are Otto 
Wachsmann and his children and their children (with the ex-
ception of the complainants) and the husbands and wives of 
such of the said defendants as are married. The defendants, 
F. l\I. Neblett, Rosalind Rose Neblett and Gatewood-Simmons, 
who are among the petitioners herein, filed an answer where-
in they concurred in the allegations and prayer of the bill of 
complaint and in which they prayed that the relief therein 
sought be granted insofar as the same affected the interests 
of the said defendants. The defendants, Otto Wachsmann, 
Margaret F. W achsmann, Rudolph Wachsmann, Rebecca 
3* Wachmann, Madonna Jones, John Jones, *Ralph Lee 
Dunn and '11heresa Dunn filed a joint answer, wherein 
they denied the conclusion made in the bill of complaint that 
the effect of the above-mentioned deed was to vest in William 
Rudolph Rose and the other grandchildren of Otto R. Wachs-
mann interests in the real estate described in the bill 
of complaint. Kinsey Spotswood, guardian ad liteni for 
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all of the nine infant defendants, filed an answer on behalf of 
the said infant defendants. The defendants, Otto Wachs-
mann and Margaret F. w· achsmann, filed a demurrer to the 
bill of complaint. All of the said answers and the said de-
murrer were filed by orders of the lower court. 
The sole issue involved in this appeal is that raised by the 
fourth ground of the demurrer, which is as follows: '' The 
bill of complaint, insofar as the same relates to the claim of 
William Rudolph Rose that he has an interest in the real 
estate in the bill and proceedings described, shows on its face 
that the said William Rudolph Rose has no interest in the 
said real estate.'' After hearing argument on the demurrer, 
the lower court, on the 27th day of April, 1949, entered an 
order sustaining the said fourth ground of the demurrer and 
dismissing the bill of complaint "insofar as the same relates 
to the claim of William Rudolph Rose that he and the other 
grandchildren of Otto R. vVachsmann, born or to be born to 
the children of the said Otto R. W achsmann, have an interest 
in the real estate in the bill and proceedings described * • *. 
Your petitioners are William Rudolph Rose, one of the com-
plainants, all of the infant defendants, Kinsey Spotswood, 
guardian ad liteni for the said infant defendants, and the de-
fendants, Rosalind Rose Neblett, F. M. Neblett and Gatewood 
Simmons, the said petitioners being all of the grand-children 
of Otto Wachsmann and the husbands of two of the said 
4* *grandchildren who are married. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. . 
Your petitioners aver that the lower court erred in the fol-
lowing particulars: 
In sustaining the four th ground of the demurrer filed by 
the defendants, Otto W achsmann and Margaret F. Wachs-
mann, and, for that reason, dismissing the bill of complaint 
as to your petitioners, the effect of which ruling was to hold 
that your petitioners have no interest in the property de-
scribed in the bill of complaint. 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN APPEAL. 
The sole question involved in this appeal is as to the nature 
of the estate created by the aforesaid deed dated March 1, 
1915, by which R. Wachsmann and Elizabeth Wachsmann, bis 
wife, conveyed certain tracts of land to '' Otto R. Wacbsmann 
and his children and their children", it being the contention 
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of the petitioners that the effect of the said deed was to ves_t 
in Otto Wachsnianii a life estate in the said property, with 
a joint remainder ht fee to his cliild1ien and their children. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The facts of this case are the facts alleged in the bill of 
complaint, including the three deeds :filed with the said bill 
of complaintJ as Exhibits "A"; "B" and "C ", and the facts 
stipulated by counsel as hei'einafter set forth. 
By deed dated March 1, 1915, and recorded in the Clerk's 
Office of the Circuit Court of Sussex County, in Deed Book 23, 
at page 324, R. Wachsmann and Elizabeth Wachsmann, his 
wife, conveyed certain property located in the county of 
5* Sussex, Vitginia; in the *la1iguag·e following: 
"* * • for and in consideration of $5.00 Five Dollars, and 
love we have fo1; our son Otto, The first party sells to the sec-
ond party the said Otto R. Wachsman and his children and 
their children with general wat·ranty the two farms known as 
Robinson_ and Mount Airy, co11taining· 1513 acres of land, more 
or less, Bounded on East by the Nottoway Riverf South by 
the land of L. P, Hntgrave, vVest by Chappell and the County 
Road; and North by the land of L. L Dobie and Dobie Estate. 
'' The party of the se<wnd patt; Otto R. Wachsman, has the 
right to sell the timber ort the said property and mortgage 
same to the amount of $2000.00 if Otto R. Wachsman finds it 
necessary.'' 
Subsequently; the grantors in the aforesaid deed executed 
another deed, which is elated June 8, 1917, and which is re~ 
corded in the Clerk's Office aforesaid, in Deed Book 24, at 
page 560, which said deed, insofar as material here, is in the 
words and figures following: 
''"\VITNESSETH: That ,vhereas; on the 1st day of March; 
1915t R. Wachsman and Elizabeth Wachsman, his wife, u;nder-
took to sell and convey to 0. R, vVachsnum and his c:µildren 
the property hereinafter conveyed by a deed which is duly 
recorded in the Cletk's Office in D. B. No, 23, at page 324, and 
whereas the said instrument of writing did not properly con-
vey said property the.rein mentioned and it is the intention 
and object of this deed to properly grant and convey the said 
property whfoh was intended to be conveyed theteinJ and to 
further cancel and declare nllll and void the said instrument 
of writittg, dated on Match 1st~ 1915, and to execute the f oi-
l owing deed; 
\ . . . ..• - . . .. ~ ' . . - .. 
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r ·"NOW-THEREFORE, for antl i'n-consideratioli of the-sum 
of five, ($5:00) dollars-and natural;love ~nd affeation they the. 
said R. Wachsman, and his· wife have, for their ,·son Otto R; 
iW achsman they the said parties ··of the first part do hereby. 
bargain,. sell, grant and.:convey· unto .. the sat& Otto R. Wachs .. 
man and his ehildren witb gene:r.al warranty of title the two 
farms:knpwn as Robert~on:anil Mount A_iry containing fifteen 
hund-red and thitteen.·(1513) ·.acres;,more or 'less, bounded on 
the east by the ·Nottoway ·river, south by, the land -of L. P! 
Hargrave, west ·by· the 11and· of Ghappell ·and !the--County road 
and on tbe north by the land of L. I. Dobie and the Dobie 
r estate. · 
6'' · ·*·''It "is distinctly understood and' agreed· by and be .. 
, tween:.the· party hereto that -the said 0tto· R Wachsman 
party of .the· second part has the- right to ·sell all of the timber 
on the said property, and· to further lnortgage the· said prop--
~rty to the··pmomit-of two, t}lou~and ,($2000.00) ,dolhtrs as the-
said Otto R. Wachsman deems it necessary so to do.'' 
I .. ., ' ', • • ;" • 
r The only-children··who-have· been botn to ·the· defendant~ 
Otto Wachsmann, whose wife· is .the ,defendant Margaret F. 
Wachstnartn,--are Mary ·W;· Rose, ·one,· of the complainants, 
whose .. husbnnd' is· the d'efendant- -George ··w. Rose·, and the 
f}efendant, Rudolph -Wa:chsmann; whose-wife, is the--defendant 
Rebecca: w·achstnann, ·Theresa Dunn~·,whose husband is the 
defendant Ralph Lee Dunn;· and-Madonna Jones, whose bus .. 
band ·js .the rdefendant John· Jones.· The ,only, children who 
have h~en born Jo the . said. Mary w. Rose a-i·e. William Ru-
dolph Rose, one of the complajnants, and the defendants, Rosa.., 
Jind Rose N e.blett. whose·husb~nd -is the·defentlant F. ~L Neb-
lett, Mary Jane Rose Sim:qions,,an infant, whose husband is 
the de£endant Gatewood Simmons,· and George l?ai:ham R.os~ 
and Nancy l\fargaret Rose, the last tw.o of whom are infants~ 
The only ·childr-en. "~ho ·have. been.! borij. to ·t1=Ie defendant, 
~heres~ Dunn, are :Ralph Lee Dun-µ, Jr.,; and Milton Dunn, 
i.nfants/ T4~ only cliildren who have been bo.rn to the defend .. 
~mt, Rudelph Wachsmann, ai·e the defenclant-s,·How.ard·Wachs ... 
mann, Jean .Waohsman~; Marvin Wac~smap.n ~nd ::l\llargaret 
Wachsmann, · all of ,whom a:re· infant&~. No children have been 
oorn to -the de~end~mt Madonna Jones. ; . . ! 
·: .As appears from the decree entered by. the lower court, on 
the 27th,day>of·April,-1949, ittwas stipulated between cQ.µnsel 
f' that the court in its, consideration of the demurrer ~--afore-: 
said should'.take into consideration as:·a fact that. on:March l, 
191.5, tp.e dl!k o( tJie exec"Qtion Qf the; first deed from R. 
7* W ~c)l~µr~p.n . a:P.d ·Elizabeth ·sw achsmann, his wife, de-
scribed in Paragraph 1 of the bill of complaint, and on 
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June 2, 1917; the date of the execution of the second deed from 
R. Wachsmann and wife, described in Parag1·aph 2 of t:be bill 
of complaint, Otto R. Wachsinann had four child ten living 
and nd grandchildren living and that no children were botti 
to any of the chifdren of Otto R. 1'Vaehsmann until the year 
1924''. 
By a deed dated July 22, 1940; Mary ,v. Rose ( as Mary Eifaa.: 
beth Rose) and George W. Rose, her. husband, and tlie defend.; 
antsf Theresa Dunn (as Theresa Wachsmail:n, unmarried), 
Madonna Jones (as l\fadomia vVachsniann Jones) and J. w. 
Jones, her husband, conveyed to Rudolph W achsman1 with 
General Warranty; all of their right, title and intetest, ''nmy 
and hereafter"; in and to the aforesaid "Robertson" and 
'' Mount Aity'' farms containing· 1513 acres, more ot less,. a:nd 
by deed dated January 28; 1941; the defendants; Ottd R. Wachs-
mttun and Margtth~t F. Wacbsmann; his wife, conveyed to the 
defendantt Rudolph Wachsmann, all of their tig~t, title and 
interest, vested or contingent, in and to the aforesaid "Robert-
son'' arid '' Mount Airy''; which farms are ref erred to in the 
said deed as the '' same land in all respects that was conveyed 
to Otto R_. Wachsmann and children by deed from R. Wachs-
mann and wife, dated March 11 1915, and recorded as afore-
said in said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 23; page 324; and 
which was latet attempted to be strengthened and reaffirip_ed 
by deed dated June 8; 1917, and recorded in said Clerk's Office 
in Deed Book 24; page 560, reference to a1l of which is here 
made''. 
ARGUMENT. 
Since :no case bas been found wllich can be said to be on all 
fours With t~e pr~sent case, His believed that the proper ap~ 
pfoMh f(j the sdlntion of the question presented here wil1 
8* be to eliminat~ •an possibilities except the one coiit~nded 
£or by the petitioners, viz., that the grant t.o "Otto R. 
W achsinaiiti and his children and their children'' creates a 
iife estate 1Ii Otto, with a johit remairtdet iii fee to his chil-
dren and their cbildren~the children o£ O~to and their .being 
a class which was subject to being opened up to admit new 
meip.Mrs as they came into being. . . 
The first possibility to be eliminated is that the deed does 
not ctea;te a fee simple estate in Otto. This possibility is s-qg-
gested by the line of cases beginning ,~ith Wallace v. Dold, 
3 Leigh 278, holding that a g,ift to a tnother and her children, 
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under certain circumstances, vests a fee simple estate in the 
mother. Regarding this doctrine, this court said, in the case 
of Payne v. Kennay, 151 Va. 472, at page 476: 
"The late Judge Burks ( the elder), in his excellent note 
to the opinion in Nye v. Lovitt (92 Va. 710, 24 S. E. 345), 2 
Va. Law. Reg. 38, referring to the class of cases beginning 
with Wallace v. Dold, supra, shows that in no one of them is 
the decision, that the children took no interest, rested alone on 
the language that the gift is to 'the mother and her children', 
but that 'the intention to g·ive exclusively to the woman is 
deduced from the context and the language of the instrument 
taken as a whole', and in conclusion he says: 'The decisions 
only show that when the gift is to the woman and her child 
or children, or is in trust for them, or like phraseology is used, 
the children are excluded only when it appears from the con-
text or the whole instrument taken together, that it was the 
intention to exclude them'. See also Vaughan v. Vaughan, 97 
Va. 322 (33 S. E. 603). 
"Whether construing a deed or a will, the object is to dis-
cover the intention, which is to be gathered in every case from 
the general purpose and scope of the instrument in the light 
of the surrounding circumstances. 
"It bas been sometimes said, without qualification (Seibel 
v. Rapp, 85 Va. 30, 6 S. E. 478), that a gift to the wife and her 
children is a g·ift to the wife, tbe reference to the children in-
dicating the motive for the gift; but this is too broad a state-
ment. The children are excluded only when it appears from 
the context of the whole instrument that it was the intention 
to exclude them. 
g• •n is apparent that there is nothing in the deed in-
volved in this case to indicate an intention on the part 
of the grantor to create a fee simple estate in Otto. In fact, 
a contrary intention is obvious from the provisions of the 
deed conferring upon Otto certain powers to mortgage and 
cut timber-powers that the owner of the fee would clearly 
have anyway. It is thus apparent that R. Wachsmann in-
tended to vest in the children of Otto and their children an 
estate of some kind, the exact nature of which will be dis-
cussed later. 
Normally, a devise or grant to a parent and children will 
vest a joint estate in the parent and children. There is an 
extensive treatment of gifts of this type in an annotation in 
161 A. L. R., at page 612, and particular attention is called to 
the discussion therein of the rule in Virginia, which is referred 
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to as the "motive rule" (seep. 665). 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the deed in ques-
tion does not create a fee simple estate in Otto. 
It should be equally apparent that the deed does not have 
the effect of creating· a joint fee in Otto and his children and 
their children. The fact that Otto is given limited rights with 
respect to the disposition of the property conveyed (he could 
only sell the timber and mortgage same to the extent of $2,-
000) is inconsistent with the idea of a joint fee in Otto and 
his children or a joint fee in Otto and bis children and their 
children. Had it been the intention of the grantors to give 
Otto a fee simple interest jointly with others, he, along with 
his co-tenants, would have had the right to sell not only the 
timber and mortgage the land without restraint, but he 
10* would have had the right, along with his *co-tenants, to 
dispose of all interests in the property. It is not un-
usual, however, that a life tenant be given certain powers of 
disposition, even to the extent of complete power of aliena-
tion. .Such powers are valid, while an attempt to restrain 
alienation by an owner of the fee is void. Hall v. Hoak, 184 
Va. 821. .Since the deed should be so construed as to give ef-
fect to all of its provisions, so long as no rule of law is vio-
lated, it slwuld be held that Otto took a life estate to which 
was annexed certain powers not ordinarily incidental to life 
estates. 
It may, therefore, be concluded at this point that Otto ac.:. 
quired a life estate under the deed of 1915, and not a fee simple 
interest as a joint tenant. The nature of the interests ac-
quired by the children of Otto and their children will be dis.: 
cussed later. 
The deed of 1915 did not create a fee tail in Otto which, 
under §5150 of the Code of Virgfoia, would have been con-
verted into a fee simple estate. It is essential to the creation 
of a fee tail by a deed that words of inheritance be used. In 
1 1\Hnor on Real Property (Ribble Edition), at page 235, it 
is said: 
'' At common law, in the creation of estates tail as of other 
estates of inheritance, the word 'heirs' was indispensable 
( qualified in the case of the fee tail by other words such as 
'of the body', showing from whom the heirs are to spring). 
But no particular words of procreation are requisite, that is, 
words showing· of whose body the issue is to be gotten. It is 
enough if it appears with reasonable certainty from whom the 
issue is to spring. 
'' Thus, a conveyance 'to A and his heirs, namely, the heirs 
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of his body', or 'to A and his heirs, of himself lawfully 
11 • issuing or begotten', or 'of his aiwife begotten '-all these 
suffice to create an estate tail. 
"But, as in other instances of inl1eritance~ cr~ated at com-
mon law by deed, no synonym or ch1cumloc-qtion can in gen-
eral supply the place of the word 'heirs'. ·w'ithout that word, 
the conveyance will usually create a life estate only, tho1Jgh 
other words be used having the same meaning as 'h~irs of the 
body. Thus, the phi·ase 'to A and the issue of his body,' 
or 'to A and his offspring' will at common law create only 
a life estate in A, if used in a deed.'' 
The following ~tatemont of the law pp the s~me s-qbject is 
found in 19 Am, J-qr., at page 5ll: 
"The authorities have generally held that in order to create 
an estat~ tail, words of inheritance as well as words of pro-
creation are necessary. A deed to a woman for and dui·ing 
her ~ab1ral lif~, a11d at her death to her children whi~h may 
be b~gotten of her 1>resent husband, creates in her a life estate 
with rerru:iinder to ·her children so begotten~ It lf1ck;E1 the op-
erative word 'heirs' to make it a fee tail. The words f de cor-
pore suo', however, are not necessary, but may be supplied by 
equivalent words plainly designating or pointing out"the body 
from whom the heirs inheritable are to issue or descend. So 
the words 'lawful issue', 'heirs of his body', and 'issue of his 
body', as words of limitation, necessarily' designate the heirs 
.intended to inherit and convert the fee simple into a fee tail; 
for the grantee could not have issue or lawful issue except of 
his body. A deed to one and her 'natural heirs' produces the 
same estate.'' 
Since counsel for the respondents &rgued in the lower court 
that the deed of 1915 created im estate tail, it is &nticipated 
that the same argument will be made in this coµrt. It 
12• was *contended that the lang1.n1.ge; to ~'Otto R. Wachs-
man and his children and their children'' evidences an 
intention on the part of the grantors to entail the Pl:Op~rty 
to Otto and the heirs of his body in indefinit~ succession. But, 
as has been observed, estates tail cm) be created. in d(}eds only 
by the use of words of inheritanc~. As is observed by :Minor 
in the statement quoted above, even such language in a. deed 
as to "A and his ·offspring·" will, ~t commf;m law, not suffice 
to create a fee tail. But, as Minor further observed: 
"In the creation of an estate tail by devise, as in the crea-
tion of a fee simply by the same means, the intention of the 
testator is looked tQ rather than any technical form of words. 
Hence, if that intention be clearly expressed or necessarily 
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implied to create an estate tail, such will be the effect, though 
the formal words of inheritance be absent.'' Minor op. cit. 
suprn, at page 236. 
An example of the creation of an estate tail by implication 
in a will under the Rule in Wild's case is found in the case of 
Larew, 3rd v. Larew, 2nd, 146 Va. 134. In that case there was 
a devise to the testator's wife "during her life; at her death 
to go'' to his son, '' and his children; and if he should die with-
out surviving heirs, then'' to the children of the testator's 
brothers and sisters then living. Since it was apparent that 
the testator did not use the word ''heirs'' as meaning heirs 
at law, the will was construed as creating· an estate tail in the 
testator's son and the heirs of l1is body, which, by statute, is 
converted into a fee simple. It is clear from the language of 
the court in this case that it reg·ards the Rule in Wild 's case 
as applicable only to devises. Moreover, there is nothing hi 
this case to indicate that even a devise to a person and "his 
children and their children'' would be construed as 
13* creating a fee tail, when there is no *qualifying language 
indicating· that '' children and their children'' are in7 
tended to mean "heirs of his body" or "issue" in indefinite 
succession. 
In the present case the deed not only does not use words 
of inheritance, but it is apparent from the fact that the 
grantor gave Otto certain limited rig·hts with respect to the 
sale of timber and mortgaging the "same" that there was no 
intention to create an estate tail. 
It is possible to imagine that the effect of the deed of 1915 
was to create estates or interests of a character different from 
those suggested above, but none of these seem to be worthy 
of serious discussion. Thus, it might be suggested that the 
deed vested a life estate in Otto, with a remainder for life to 
his children, and the remainder in fee to their children. Or, 
it mig·ht be contended that the grantor intended to give Otto 
a life estate, with the remainder to his children or to the chil-
dren of such of his children as might be dead at the time of 
the death of Otto. 
It seems, however, that the only tenable approach to a so-
lution of the problem is this. It may be definitely said that 
Otto acquired a life estate under the deed. What, then, is the 
nature of the estates conferred upon the children of Otto and 
their children Y This much is apparent: The grantors grouped 
the children of Otto and their children together in a single 
class without any attempt to make a clifferentation based upon 
the difference between the generations of the members of the 
class. It is to be observed, first, that it is not necessary that 
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all members of a class of remaindermen actually be in being 
at the time of the creation of a remainder; indeed, none 
14~ of them need be. Even in Virginia, where the "motive" 
*rule is apJ?lied, a gift to a parent and children, without 
more, vests a jomt fee simple estate in the parent and chil-
dren in equal proportions. It should not materially alter the 
result i£ it happens that the estate given to a parent and chil-
dren is preceded by a life estate, as is the case here. Upon 
the termination of the life estate, the grant may be viewed 
just as it woulc~ have been had there been no preceding life 
estate. Thus viewed, we find here a conveyance to a parent, 
or more precisely to several parents, and to their children. 
The fact that there are several parents should not vary the 
legal situation. 
In discussing remainders to a class, it is noted in 1 Minor 
on Real Property (Ribble edition), at page 944 (£ootnote): 
'' There is a material difference between the popular and 
legal signification of a "class.'' Popularly, a class of per-
sons means a number of persons who can all be desig·nated 
by one general name, e. g., children, nephews, etc. But in law 
a gift to a class is a gi£t of an ag·grega te sum to a body of per-
sons, who are all to take in equal or some other definite pro-
portions, so that the amount to be received by any one donee 
cannot be ascertained until all the persons who are to take 
and the ultimate proportions in which they are to take, have 
been finally determined. Jarman on Wills ( 6th Ed.), 232 ; 
Page, Wills §540; L. R. A. 1918B, 239, note. The nature of a 
gift, whether to a class or distributively within the terms of 
the description used, depends, of course, upon the intent of 
the testator or grantor. Saunders v. Sa1.1,nders, 1091 Va. 191, 
63 S. E. 410. Prima facie, a gift to persons who are included 
under some general description and bear some relation to the 
gTantor or testator, or have some common relation to each 
other is a class gift. L. R. A. 1918B, 234, note. A class, how-
ever, may be composed of persons who are grouped as such 
by the testator, even though they do not comprise a natural 
group or come under any common description. Thus in Saun-
ders v. Saunders, supra, a testator devised all his property 
to his wife for life, with remainder to his wal'd and to the chil-
dren of his brother, share and share alike. By codicil the de-
vise to the ward was revoked. The brother left five children 
all of whom were living at the elate of the execution of the 
will, but one died before the testator, leaving issue. It was 
claimed by the heirs of the testator that he died intestate as 
to the share wl1ich would have gone to the ward but for 
15~ the *codicil revoking her share. It was held that the ef-
fect of the revocation was to take the ward out of the 
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claRs originally made by the will, and to leave the entire re-
siduum to go to the brother's children. 
'' The intention of the testator or grantor should control 
as to when the class is to be determined and the remainders 
vested, provided his intention does not contravene some posi-
tive rule of law. In accordance with the principle that the 
law favors vested estates, the instrument will normally be con-
strued to determine the class at the time the instrument takes 
effect.'' 
Thus, it is apparent that the fact that the remaindermen 
in this case are of two distinct generations does not render 
them any less a "class" than would be the case if they were 
all of the same generation. As applied here, we have a class, 
some of whom were living at the time of the g-rant and some 
of whom were subsequently born. Here we have a vested re-
mainder subject to being opened up to admit subsequently 
born members of the class. This subject is treated as follows 
in 1 Minor on Real Property (Ribble edition), §719: 
''Upon a devise or conveyance to A for life, remainder to 
A's children, or remainder to the children of B ( or in the place 
of children, read nephews, brothers, brothers and sisters, or 
remainder to B's issue, descendants, etc., or any designated 
class of persons), such a remainder would seem at first glance 
to be contingent by reason of the uncertainty as to what per-
sons will constitute the class mentioned at the expiration of 
the particular estate. And in fact it is contingent, so long 
as there are none of the class in existence, for the remainder 
is then to persons not in being. 
"But it is established that in gifts to a class of persons, 
all members of the class living at the testator's death or at 
the time of the conveyance take vested remainders, subject 
to open up and let in others who are subsequently born before 
the termination of the particular estate, the shares of the 
others being in such case proportionately diminished though 
until one of such class comes into being, the remainder is con-
tingent. But at common law, no member of the class not com-
ing into existence before the termination of the particular 
estate could take, as that would be to permit a gap between 
the preceding estate and the remainder, and would violate the 
common law rule that the remainder must take effect 
16* during *the continuance of the particular estate or at 
the very moment of its termination. But in Virginia by 
statute it is provided no remainder shall fail for the want of 
a particular estate to support it, so that it is believed the 
vested remainder in those members of a class who are in be-
ing is in Virginia liable to open up and let in others of the 
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class who come into being after the termination of the par-
ticular estate as well as those born before that time. It is true 
that there is a line of Virginia decisions in which it is stated 
broadly that, upon a devise "to A for life, remainder to his 
children", the remainder is a vested remainder belonging· to 
the children living at the testator's death, from which it might 
perhaps be inferred that the vested remainder is confined to 
such children and is not liable to open up and let in others 
subsequently born. But all these are cases where no children 
were subsequently born, but where somn had died since the 
death of the testator and during the continuance of the par-
ticular estate, and the question for decision was whether the 
remainders were contingent in sucp of the children only as 
might survive the life tenant or vested in the whole class in 
existence at the testator's death, the court uniformly holding 
the latter view." 
As applied to this case, the foregoing rules would mean that, 
upon the death of the life tenant, Otto, the remainder would 
vest in the children of Otto and their children then living, but 
would be subject to being opened up to admit others who 
migllt subsequently come into being. It is assumed that it 
will be argued that this construction of the deed is objection-
able because it will be impossible to determine the extent of 
the interests of the remaindermen until after the death of the 
last of the four children of Otto. It is true that the law favors 
the early vesting of estates, but this rule should not be applied 
to defeat the lawful intent of the grantor as expressed in his 
deed. See Roberts v. Scyhers, 128 Va. 85. 
As an alternative to the construction sug·gested above, it 
migllt very well be held that, upon the death of Otto, the re-
mainder will vest absolutely in the children of Otto, and their 
children, living· at the time of Otto's death, and would not 
open up to admit children born later to Otto's children. 
17'!1= This construction is *based upon a presumption that 
the grantor in the deed of 1915 desired the children of 
Otto to have the full enjoyment of tl1eir interests during their 
lifetimes-a situation that would not be possible if those in-
terests were subject to being diminislwd as long· as the possi-
bility existed that other children might be born to Otto or to 
any of Otto's children. 
It should be too clear for argument that the deed of June 
8, 1917, could not possibly have tl1e effect of varying in any 
way the character of the estates created by the deed of 1915. 
The subsequent deed recites that the first deed "did not 
properly convey said property therein mentioned and it is 
the intention and object of this deed to properly grant and 
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convey the said property which was intended to be conveyed 
therein and to further cancel and declare null and void the 
said instrument of writing·, dated March 1st, 1915, and to ex-
ecute the following· deed;". 
The :first deed purports to convey all interests in the prop-
erty described therein to '' Otto R. Wachsman and his chil-
dren and their children". The later deed erroneoitsly recites 
that by the former deed the grantors, "R. Wachsman and 
Elizabeth Wachsman, his wife, undertook to sell and convey 
to 0. R. Wachsman and his children [the words ''and their 
children" being omitted fr<?m the recital] the property here-
inafter conveyed", and the grautors then proceed to convey 
to their son '' Otto R. Wachsman and his children'' the two 
farms known as "Robertson" and "Mount Ahy". The ob~ 
vious intent of the deed of 1917 ,,·as to destroy the interests 
created for the benefit of the unborn cllildren of Otto's chil-
dren. Since the law recognizes that interests in real estate 
may be created for the benefit of persons who, when they 
18* come into being·, will actually •X•acquire the interests 
created for their benefit before their birth, it should be 
obvious that no one, not even the creator of such interests, 
can destroy them. The ref ore, if, as your petitioners contend, 
interests were created by the :first deed for the benefit of the 
unborn children of Otto's children, the grantors attempt by 
the dater deed to destroy those interests was of no effect what-
soever. The second deed cannot even be looked to as evidence 
that the grantors intended in the first deed to convey the 
property to Otto and his children only. Any such alleged in-
tention is absolutely at variance with the plain words of the 
deed describing the grantees as '' Otto R. Wachsman and his 
children and their children''. There is no ambiguity in this 
languag·e. No question of construction arises. Williams v. 
Miller, 184 Va. 274. Certainly, a conveyance to A, B and C 
cannot be construed as a conveyance to A and B only. It 
should be equally certain that, if the :first deed created inter-
ests that were to become vested in the children of Otto's chil-
dren as they came into being, the grantors were without power 
to destroy those interests by a subsequent deed by which they 
attempt to say that they did not intend to do the thing that 
they in fact did. 
Anticipating· the argument made in the lower court that the 
word ''sells" in the granting clause of the deed of 1915 was 
inadequate to effect a conveyance of the property, reference 
is made to the case of Albert v. Holt, 137 Va. 5. In that case, 
it was contended that the words "g·ive, bargain and sell" are 
not words of conveyance, but the court said: 
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'' It is claimed br the plaintiff in error that the words '' give, 
bargain and sell' are not words of conveyance and cannot 
be made to operate as such. The i11strument is in all other 
respects in the form of a deed, a11d contains a covenant 
19'* of warranty, was *acknowledged and admitted to record 
as a deed, and was based upon a consideration of $1,300 
paid for the land. We are of the opinion that the instrument 
is a valid conveyance of the land therein mentioned from the 
grantor to the g1·antee. 
"Section 5146 of the Code declares that all real estate, as 
regards the immediate freehold, shall be deemed to lie in grant 
as well as in Hvery, thereby dispensing· with livery of seisin, 
and section 5162 declares that a deed niay be made in the fol-
lowing form, or to the same effect, but we have no statute 
fixing an invariable form for deeds of conveyance of land. 
The form g·iven in section 5162 used the word '' gTant, '' but 
that is not an indispensable requisite. As said of a similar 
statute in South Dakota, "While our statute uses the term 
'grant,, and in the form given uses that term, yet to consti-
tute a grant it is not indispensable that technical words be 
used. Any words that inanifest the sau1e will be sufficient." 
Evensen v. Webster, 3 So. Dak. 382, 388, 53 N. W. 747, 749, 44 
Am. St. Rep. 802, 807. 
'' Courts ate liberal in construing written contracts includ-
ing deeds, in order to give effect to the intention of the parties, 
where that is manifest, if not testrained by sotnc inexorable 
rule of law. The law on this subject is well stated in 8 R. C. 
L. 1049, supported by nnnrnrous nutliorities as follows: 'The 
general rule is that n deed must be upheld if possible. In-
deed, it bas been said to be an elementary pdnciple that every 
deed tntlst; if possible; be made operative, and that the law 
desires to sustain the validity of this class of insfrumenh: 
wherever it can. The true principle, and one entirely in ac-
co:rdance with modern jurisprudence, is, that all instruments 
shall be so co:hstrused as to pass an estate, when such was the 
intention, and it will be presumed from the muking of a deed 
that the grantor intend~d to convey some propetty by it. The 
courts are, therefote, liberal in construing deeds so as to give 
them effect and a deed unteclmical, ungTammatical, and totally 
at variance with ·an the recognized rules of orthography, may 
be valid if there are sufficient words to declare clearly and 
leg·ally the maker's meaning, nor is it necessary that the 
g-rammatical sense of words be adhei'ed to, where a contraty 
intent is apparent from the whole instrument.' See also Ei,en-
son v. Webster, supra, Berridge v. Glassey, 112 Pa. St. 442, 
3 Atl. 583, 56 Am. Rep. 322; Flagg v. 1Ea1nes, 40 Vt. 16, 94 Am. 
Dec. 363 ; Note 31 Am. St. Rep. 24. 
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"In the case at bar, the intention to "grant" is so mani-
fest on the face of the instrument tba t no other construction 
could be put upon it, and it would be a miscarriage of justice 
and a perversion of the intention of the parties to hold other-
wise.'' 
20* *In the present case, the instrument in question is in 
the form of a deed. It begins with the words "This 
Deed * • * ". The consideration is recited to be five dollars, 
and '' love we have for our son Otto". It contained a covenant 
of general warranty. It is an instrument under the seals of 
the grantors and it was duly acknowledged and admitted to 
record as a deed. As was said in the Albert case, s-itvra, '' the 
intention to 'grant' is so manifest on the face of the instru-
ment that no other construction could be put upon it * * """. 
In conclusion, we wish to emphasize that the primary func-
tion of the court in this case is to ascertain the intention of 
the grantors in the deed of 1915 and to give effect to that in-
tention. This court, in the case of Horne v. Horne, 181 Va. 
685, said (at page 691): 
'' 'The same rules applicable to the construction of wills 
are equally applicable to the construction of deeds. Lindsey 
v. Eckles, 99 Va. 668, 671, 40 S. E. 23 (1901). As was there 
said: "Whether construing a deed or a will, the object is to 
discover the intention, which is to be gathered in every case 
from the g·eneral purpose and scope of the instrument, in the 
light of the surrounding circumstances. Stace v. Bumgard-
ner, 89 Va. 418; Porn. Eq. Jnr. (2nd ed.) sec. 1012." 
'' 'Technical rules of construction are not to be invoked to 
defeat the intention of the maker of the instrument, when his 
or her intention clearly appears by giving to the words used 
their natural and ordinary import.' 
" 'The inquiry is, therefore, what did the grantor intend 
by the language he employed in the creation of the remainders 
in ''The Grove", after the expiration of the life estate ":re-
served and created by the clause which disposed of that farm T 
''The intention of the grantor must be g·athered from the lan-
guage be has seen fit to employ". Wilson v. Langho1rne, 102 
Va. 631, 637 (1904).' " 
Your petitioners are children of the children of Otto. It is 
manifest that the grantors intended that they should 
21 * have an *interest in the property. Modern statutes have 
had the effect of a bo1ishing· many of the artificial re-
straints placed upon the alienation of real estate by deed. Sec-
tion 5147 of the Code of Virginia (Michie 1942) permits any 
interest in or claim to real estate, even contigent interests, to 
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be disposed of by will or deed and otherwise liberalizes the 
law with respect to conveyances by deed. Section 5153 of the 
Code provides that a contingent remainder shall in no case 
fail for want of a particular estate to support it. The reasons 
behind the common law requirements that the vesting of re-
mainders be hastened and that contingent remainders be cut 
off entirely in many cases no long·er exist because of the stat-
ute ( Code of Virginia §5161) permitting the sale of conting-
ent interests and providing for the protection of the interests 
of "unborn persons". Because of these and other statutes, 
the courts are no longer compelled by archaic principles of 
the common law to frustrate the intention of grantors in 
deeds. Usually, no more is necessary than to ascertain and 
give effect to the intention of the grantor. 
· While your petitioners have taken the position that the deed 
of 1915 should be construed as granting a life estate to Otto 
R. Vv achsman, with the remainder in fee jointly to his chil-
dren and their children, their primary concern is that it be 
determined that they have an interest in the property as, re-
maindermen. As has already been suggested, the court might, 
instead of holding that the remainder is to remain open until 
the death of the last of Otto's children, very properly find 
that the remainder will close entirely upon the death of Otto 
and will then vest in the children of Otto and their chil-
22• dren who may be alive at the time of Otto's ""death. An-
other possibility is that the deed be held to have vested 
a joint life estate in Otto and his children, with the remainder 
to the grandchildren of Otto. This view finds support in the 
principle that a g·ift to a parent and his children, without 
inore, vests a joint fee simple estate in the parent and chil-
dren-that is, the parent and children are given estates of 
equal dig·nity. Hence, when it happens, as in this case, that 
the parent, Otto, is obviously given a life estate, it may well 
be said that the grantors intended that Otto's children should 
have an estate of the same dignity, a life estate, jointly with 
Otto. Under this construction, upon the death of the last of 
Otto's children, or upon Otto's death if all of his children 
should predecease him, the fee would vest jointly in Otto's 
grandchildren. 
In support of the construction passing· a life estate to Otto 
and his then living children, it was held in the famous Wild's 
case that: 
'' If a man devises land to A and to his children or issue, 
and he th.en have issue of his body, there his express intent 
may take effect, according to the rule of the common law, and 
no manifest and certain intent appears in the will to the con-
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trary. And therefore in such case, they shall have but -a 
joint estate for life.'' 1 Minor on Real Property (Ribble) 
2nd Edition, footnote, page 239. 
Furthermore, it has been held by numerous authorities that 
d1ildren in existence at the time of the deed will take to the 
exclusion of after-born children. Cullens v. Ciillens, 161 N. C. 
344; Loyless v. Blacksheer, 43 Ga. 327; 1.11 oore v. Lee, 105 Ala. 
435. 
In breaking down the granting clause '' to Otto and his chil-
dren and their children" into two groups: ( 1) "to Otto and 
his children'' constituting one group in which all are in being 
and determined at the time of the deed; ( 2) '' and their 
23* children", none of whom were *in being at the time of 
the deed and logfoally would form a separate g·roup or 
class, and keeping in mind that the intention of the parties 
controls, it would appear that the gTantor conveyed an estate 
to Otto and this grantor's gTandchildren, all of whom he knew 
at the time. Now, the second grouping· "and their children" 
would in actuality be the grantor's grandchildren, and it is 
apparent that the grantor intended to create an estate for this 
unborn group. The fact that this group was not in being at 
the time of the deed does not preclude them from taking an 
estate. 
It is set forth in Section 5153 of the Code of Virginia 1942 
that: '' A contingent remainder shall in no case fail or want 
of a particula;r estate to support it.'' 
By transposition and analogy, placing· '' and their children'' 
( the grandchildren of Otto) in the same position as '' and his 
children", it would follow that the grandchildren take the re-
mainder in fee .bv wav of executorv limitation. "Under a 
conveyance to A and Ii.is children, ,vhere no children are liv-
ing the children, if any are subsequently born, take by way 
of executory limitation, the intent being that all shall take.'' 
1 Minor on Real Property (Ribble) 2nd Edition, footnote, 
page 239. In support of this construction, it was held in a 
conveyance to A and her children, A took a life estate and the 
remainder to the children. The word ''children'' was used 
as a word of purchase and as there were no children living at 
the time of the deed, A took a life estate with remainder to the 
children. Fales v. Currier, 55 N. H. 392. · 
It is to be noted that there is a sharp line of distinction in 
the construction of "to A and his children" when (1) there 
are children living at the time of the deed, and (2) when 
24* there are *no children in being and are subsequently 
born. In the former a joint estate is created either in 
fee or for life, depending upon the surrounding· circumstances, 
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wliile in the latter A takes a life estate with remainder in fee 
to the children. The ref ore, the deed of 1915 '' to Otto and his 
children and their children'' is1 in effect, passing only a life 
estate to Otto and his living children, with certain provisions 
and qualifications on Otto's interest and the remainder in.fee 
to the grandchildren. 
For the reasons assigned herein, your petitioners pray that 
an appeal be allowed from the aforesaid decree of the Circuit 
Court of Sussex County, Virginia; that the said decree be re-
viewed and reversed; that a final decree be entered in favor 
of your petitioners, establishing their rights in the property 
involved in this proceeding; and that your petitioners may 
have. such other further relief as the nature of their case may 
reqmre. 
This petition is to be filed in the Office of the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, at Richmond, Vir-
ginia. 
Your petitioners adopt this petition as their opening brief. 
Counsel for the petitioners do not desire to state orally their 
reasons for reviewing· the decree aforesaid. 
A copy of this petition was delivered, in person, to oppos-
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I, Benjamin T. Kinsey, Jr., of Petersburg, Virginia, an at..: 
torney duly qualified to practice in the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, do certify that, in my opinion, the decree 
complained of in the foregoing petition ought to be reviewed. 
BENJAMIN T. KINSEY, JR. 
Received August 26, 1949. 
M. B. vV ATTS, Clerk. 
Oct. 10, 1949-Appeal awarded by the court. Bond $300. 




Pleas before the Circuit Court of Sussex County at the 
Courthouse thereof, on the 7th day of February, 1949: 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office of said Court, on the 7th day of February, 1949, came 
Mary W. Rose and William Rudolph Rose, Complainant by 
their attorney's and filed their BiII of Complaint_ for judg-
ment against Rudolph W achsmann, Rebecca W achsmann, 
Otto Wacbsmann, Margaret F. vVachsmann, F. M. Neblett, 
Rosalind Rose Neblett, Gatewood Simmons, Ralph Lee Dunn, 
Theresa Dunn, George W. Rose, Madonna Jones and John 
Jones, and Mary Jane Rose Simmons, George Parham Rose, 
Nancy Margaret Rose, Ralph Lee Dunn, Jr., Milton Dunn, 
Howard Wachsmann, Jean Wachsmann, Marvin Wachsmann 
and Margaret W achsmann, the last nine of whom are infants, 
Defendants, in the words and figures following: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Sussex County. 
:Mary W. Rose and William Rudolph Rose 
v. 
Rudolph W achsmann, Rebecca W achsmann, Otto W achsmann, 
Margaret F. Wachsmann, F. M. Neblett, Rosalind 
page 2 ~ Rose Neblett, Gatewood Simmons, Ralph Lee Dunn, 
Theresa Dunn, George W. Rose, Madonna Jones 
and John Jones, and Mary Jane Rose Simmons, George 
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Parham Rose, Nancy Margaret Rose, Ralph Lee Dunn, Jr., 
Milton Dunn, Howard Wachsmann, Jean Wachsmann, Mar-
vin W achsmann and Margaret W achsmann, the last nine of 
whom are infants. 
BILL OF COMPLAINT. 
To the Honorable J. J. Temple, Judge of said CourL 
Your complainants, Mary W. Rose and William Rudolph 
Rose respectfully represent unto your Honor _the following 
case: 
1. That, by deed dated March 1, 1915, and recorded in the 
Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Sussex County, in Deed 
Book 23, at page 324, R. Wachsmann and Elizabeth Wachs-
mann, his wife, conveyed certain property, located in the 
county of Sussex, Virginia, in the language following: 
'' for and in consideration of $5.00 Five Dollars, and 
love we have for our son Otto, The first party sells to the 
second party the said Otto R. Wachsman and his children and 
their children with general warranty the two farms known as 
Robinson and Mount Airy, containing 1513 acres of land, 
more or less, Bounded on East by the Nottoway River, South 
by the land of L. P. Hargrave, West by Chappell and the 
County Road, and North by the land of L. I. Dobie and Dobie 
Estate. 
"The party of the second part, Otto R. Wachsman, has the 
rig·ht to sell the timber on the said property and 1norgage same 
to the amount of $2,000.00 if Otto R. Wachsman finds it neces~ 
sary. '' 
pag·e 3 ~ ( A copy of the said deed, marked Complainants' 
Exhibit "A", is filed herewith and is prayed to be 
taken and read as a part of this bill of complaint.) 
2. That, subsequently, the grantors in the said deed to-wit: 
R. Wachsman and Elizabeth Wachsman, his wife, executed 
another deed which is dated June 8, 1917, and which is re-
corded in the Clerk's Office aforesaid, in Deed Book 24, at 
page 560, the said deed being in the words and :figures follow-
ing, to-wit: ·· · 
"vVITNESSETH: That whereas, on the 1st day of March, 
1915, R. Wachsman and Elizabeth Wachsman, his wife, un-
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dertook to sell and convey to 0. R. Wachsman and his chil-
dren the property hereinafter conveyed by a deed which is 
,luly recorded in the clerk's office in D. B. No. 23, at page 324. 
and \vhereas the said instrument of writing did not properly 
convey said property therein mentioned and it is the intention 
and 'object of this deed to properly grant and convey the said 
property which was intended to be conveyed therein, and to 
furthe1; cancel and declare null and void the said instrument 
of writing, dated on March 1st, 1915, and to execute the fol-
. lowing deed; 
''No,v, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum 
of five (5.00) dollars and natural love and affection they the 
said R. Wachsman and his wife have for thefr sdn Otto R. 
Wachsman they the said patties of the first.part do hereby 
bargain, sell, grant, and convey unto the said Otto 
pugr. 4 ~ R. Wach,stnan .and his c.hildren with general war-
i-anty of title the two farms known as Robertson 
nnd Mount Airy containing fifteen hundred and thirteen 
(1.513) acres, more or less, bounded on the east by the Notto-
way River, south by the land of L. P. Hatgtave, west by the 
land of Chappell and the County road and on the north by 
the land of LI Dobie and the Dobie estate. 
''It is distinctly understood and agreed by and between the 
party hereto that the said Otto R. -Wachsman party of the 
second part has the right to sell all of the timber on the said 
p1•operty, and to furthe1• modgage the said property to the 
amount of two thousand (2000.00) dollars as the said Otto 
R. Wachsman deems it necessary so to do." 
3. That your complainant, Mary W. Rose (whose husband 
is Georg·e W. Rose), and the defet1dants, Rudolph ,vachsman 
(whose wife is Rebecca Wachsmann), Theresa Dunn (whose 
husband is Ralph Lee Dunn), and Madonna Jones (whose hus-
band is J olm Jones) are the only cl1ildren who J.?-ave been born 
to the defendant, Otto Wacbstnamt (whose wife is :Margaret 
F. Wachsmann). 
4. (a) That the complainant, "\Villiatn Rudolph Rose, and 
the defendants, Rosalind Rose Neblett (whose husb~nd is F. 
M. Neblett), Mary Jane Rose Simmons, an infant (whose hus-
band is Gatewood Simmons), and George Parhan1 Rose and 
Nancy l\fargatet Rose, the last two of whom are in-
page 5 ~ fauts under the age of fourteen years, are the only 
childMrt who have been to your complainant, Mary 
W. Rose. 
(b) That Ralph Lee Dunn, Jr., and Milton Dunn, infants 
under the ag·e of fourteen years, are the. only children who 
have been born to the defendant, Theresa Dunn. 
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( c) That the defendants, Howard vVachsmann, Jean Wachs-
mann, Marvin Wachsmann and Margaret Wachsmann, all of 
whom are infants under the age of fourteen vears, are the 
only children who have been born to the defendant, Rudolph 
Wachsmann, and that no children have been born to the de-
fendant, Madonna Jones. · _ 
5. Your complainants are advised, and therefore aver, that 
the rights and interest of Otto Wachsmann '' and his children 
and their children", the grantees in the aforesaid deed from 
R. W achsmann, dated March 1, 1915, in and to the property 
described in the said deed, are fully defined and established; 
in that deed and that the attempt made by the said R. Wachs-· 
mann in the subsequent deed dated June 8, 1917, to extinguish 
the said rights and interests of the children of the said Otto 
Wachsmann in and to the said property in null and void and 
of no effect whatsoever, as is the attempt by the said R. Wachs-
mann in the said subsequent deed to '' further cancel and de-
clare null and void'' the afore said prior deed of March 1, 
1915. 
6. Your complainants are advised, and therefore further 
aver, that the language of the last paragraph of the 
page .6 ~ aforesaid deed of March 1, 1915, to-wit: ''The party 
of the second part, Otto R. Wachsmfln, has the right 
to sell the timber on the said property and morga.qe same to 
the amount of $2000.00 if Otto R. Wachsman finds it neces-
sary,'' should be construed as conferring upon the said Otto 
R. Wachsmann the right to sell timber from the property 
aforesaid, having a value not exceeding $2000.00, if the said 
Otto R. Wachsmann should find it necessary to do so; but, not-
withstanding, the limitation imposed, as aforesaid, upon the 
right of the said Otto R. Wachsmann to sell the said timber, 
the said Otto R. Wachsmann and the defendant, Rudolph 
W achsmann, have, from time to time, sold and permitted the 
cutting of timber from the property aforesaid having a value 
far in excess of the said sum of $2000.00. 
7. That, by a deed dated July 22, 1940, and duly recorded 
in the Clerk's Office aforesaid, your complainant, Mary W. 
Rose ( as Mary Elizabeth Rose) and George W. Rose, her hus-
band, and the defendants, Theresa Dunn ( as Theresa Wachs-
mann, unmarried), Madonna Jones ( as Madonna W achsmann 
Jones) and J. W. Jones, her husband, conveyed to Rudolph 
Wachsman, with Genei~aI Warranty, all of their right, title 
and interest, '' now and hereafter'', in and to the aforesaid 
, 
''Robertson'' and '' Mount Airy'' farms containing 1513 
acres, more or less, and that by deed dated January 
page 7 ~ 28, 1941, the defendants, Otto R. W achsmann and 
Margaret F. W achsmann, his wife, conveyed to the 
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defendant, Rudolph Wachsman, all of their right, title and in-
terest, vested or contingent, in and to the aforesaid "Robert-
son" and ''Mount Airy", which farms are referred to in the 
said de~d as the ''same land in all respects that was conveyed 
to Otto R. Wachsmann and children by deed from R. w· achs-
mann and wife, dated March 1, 1915, and recorded as afore-
said in said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 23, page 324; and 
which, wa.s later attempted to be strengthened and 1·eaffirmed 
by deec). dated June 8, 1917, and recorded in said Clerk's Office 
in deed book 24, page 560, reference to all of which is here 
made".r . 
8. Tha~ ·at the time that she and her husband signed and 
executed the ~aid deed, the defendants, Otto R. W achsmaun, 
who was acting on behalf of himself and/or the defendant, 
Rudolph W achsmann, promised and represented unto your 
said complainant that he or the def end ant, Rudolph Wachs-
mann, would give or transfer to your complainant, Mary W. 
Rose, property or sums of money, the values or amounts of 
which your said complainant understood would be commensu-
rate with the value of the rights and interest conveyed by her 
as afore said to the said Rudolph W achsmann~ and particu-
larly your said complainant was g·iven assurances and prom-
ises by the said Otto R. Wachsman, who was acting on behalf 
of himself and/or the defendant, Rudolph ,vachsmann that, 
upon the sale of timber from the said farms, or 
page 8 ~ either of them, substantial sums would be paid to 
. your said complainant from the proceeds of such 
sale or sales as a consideration, or a part of the consideration, 
for the conveyance by your said complainant of her property 
rights and interest afore said to the said Rudolph ·w achs-
mann; that, immediately after the signing and execution of 
the deed aforesaid by your complainant, the defendant, Otto 
R. W achsmann, purchased and caused to be conveyed to your 
said complainant a farm in Sussex County, Virginia, known 
as the ''Roland'' place, containing 270 acres, more or less, 
having a value of approximately $2,700.00, which farm, your 
said complainant understood, was to constitute a part of the 
consideration for the conveyance of the property rights and 
interest aforesaid by your said complainant to the defendant, 
Rudolph ,v achsmann, but your complainant has received no 
other property or money from either the defendant, Otto R. 
W achsmann, or the defendant, Rudolph W achsmann, which 
constitute a part of the consideration aforesaid; that your 
complainant at no time intended to convey to the said Rudolph 
Wachsmann any of the said property or interest therein ex-
cept upon the condition that she receive in return therefor 
property or money equal in value or amount to the value of 
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_the property or the interest conveyed by her as aforesaid. to. 
the defendant, Rudolph Wachsmann; that, if the said Otto R. 
Wachsmann and the said Rudolph Wachsmann did 
page 9 ~ not understand that they, or one of them, were to 
compensate your complainant for the value of her 
said property and interest which were conveyed as aforesaid, 
there was no meeting of the minds between the said defend-
ants and your complainants and that there was a mistake as 
between the said defendants on the one hand and your com-
plainant on the other as to the nature and character of the 
transaction involving the conveyance of the property and in-
terest aforesaid by your complainant and as to the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the same; that, notwithstanding 
the fact that the defendant, Rudolph Wachsmann, acting on 
his own behalf or at the instance of the defendant, Otto R. 
W achsmann, has sold timber from the property aforesaid, 
your complainant has received no part of the consideration 
which was paid therefor: 
IN TENDER CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, and foras-
much as your complainants are remediless in the premises 
save in a court of equity where matters of this kind are only 
and properly cognizable, your complainants pray that Ru-
dolph Wachsmann, Rebecca Wachsmann, Otto Wachsmann, 
Marg·aret F. W achsmann, F. 1\L Neblett, Rosalind Rose Neb~ 
lett, Gatewood Simmons, Ralph Lee Dunn, Theresa Dunn, 
George W. Rose, Madonna Jones and John Jones, and Mary 
Jane Rose .Simmons, George Parham Rose, Nancy Margaret 
Rose, Ralph Lee Dunn, Jr., Milton Dunn, Howard Wachs-
mann, Jean W achsmann, Marvin Wachsmann and Margaret 
Wachsmann, the last nine of whom are infants, 
page 10 ~ may be made parties defendant to this bill and re-
quired to answer the same but not under oath, save 
as to such of the said defendants as are by law required to 
answer under oath; that a competent and discreet attorney 
at law be appointed guardian ad litem to represent the inter-
ests of the said defendants in this proceedings, who, as well 
as such of the infant defendants as are over fourteen years 
of age, shall be required to answer this bill under oath in 
proper person; that the aforesaid deed of June 8, 1917, be set 
aside and declared null and void, or that the same be declared 
ineffectual to change or alter in any way the rights and in-
terests of the parties thereto as defined and established by 
.the said deed; that the aforesaid deed of March 1, 1915, be 
construed, and that the rights and interests of the defendant, 
Otto W achsmann, and his children and their children in and 
to the property conveyed by the said deed be determined; that 
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it be determined that the right of the defendant, Otto Wachs-
mann, to sell timber from the said property was limited to 
timber having a value not exceeding $2,000.00; that the afore-
said deed of July 22, 1940, be set aside and declared null and 
void as to your complainant, Mary W. Rose; that, if the said 
deed should be found by the court to be -valid, the defendants 
be· r~q11ired to comply with their promise to transfer or pay 
to your complainant, Mary 1-lv. Rose, property or sums of 
money equivalent in value or amount to the value 
page 11 ~ of the property and interest conveyed in the said 
deed by your complainant; that the defendants, 
Otto Wachsmann and Rudolph ,vachsmann, be required to 
account for all sums received by them at any time or times 
on account of rents and profits and timber sold from the prop-
erty aforesaid; that the said defendants, Otto Wachsmann 
and Rudolph w·acbsmann, be enjoined and restrained from 
making further sales of timber and from cutting or permit-
ting the cutting of timber from the said property; that all 
other necessary and proper proceedings may be had and taken 
for accomplishing the prayers of this bill, and fol' such other 
relief_, both genei:al and special, as to equity may seem meet 
and tne nature of the case may require. 
And your complainants will every pray, etc. 
MARYW. ROSE 
WILLIAM RUDOLPH ROSE 
By Counsel. 
BOHANNAN, BOHANNAN & KINSEY 
For Complainant. 
page 12 ~ EXHIBIT ''A'' 
THIS DEED, made this first day oi March, 1915, by and 
between R. Wachsman and Elizabeth his wife of the first party,, 
and Otto R. Wachsman, of the second varty, all of Sussex 
County, State of Virginia. 
WITNESSETH: that for and in consideration of $5.00 
Five Dollars, and love we have for our son Otto, The first 
patty sells to the second party the said Otto R. Wachsman 
and his children and their children with general warranty the 
two farms known as Robinson and Mount Airy, containing 
1513 acres of land, more or less, Bounded on East by Notto-
way River, South by the land of L. P. Hargrave, West by 
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Chappell and the County Road, and North by the laud of L. I. 
Dobie and Dobie Estate. 
The party of the second part, Otto R. Wachsman, has the 
right to sell the timber on the said property and morgage 
same to the amount of $2000.00 if Otto R. Wachsman finds it 
necessary. 
Witness the following signatures and seals-
R. WACHSMAN (Seal) 
ELIZABETH WACHSMAN (Seal) 
State of Virginia, County of Sussex, to-wit: 
I, L. H. Wrenn, Deputy Clerk for R. D. Norris Clerk of the 
Circuit Court for the County aforesaid, in the .State of Vir-
ginia, do hereby certify that R. Wachsman and Elizabeth 
Wachsman, whose names are signed to the foregoing writing, 
bearing date on the :first day of March, in the year 1915, have 
the said R. Wachsman and Elizabeth Wachsman acknowl-
edged the same before me in my County aforesaid. 
Given under my hand this 9th day of March, in the year 
1915. 
I I ' 




L'. H. WRENN 
Deputy Clerk. 
In the Clerk's Office of Sussex Circuit Court, March 9, 1915. 
·This Deed of Gift from R. Wachsman and wife to 0. R. 
Wachsman, was this day lodged in the said office, and with the 
certificate annexed, admitted to record at 1 o'clock P. M. 3.00 
Int. ReYe. stamps affixed and cancelled. 
Teste: 
R. D. NORRIS, Clerk. 
A Copy Teste: 
JESSE HARGRAVE, Clerk. 
Recorded in D. B. 23 P. 324. 
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page 14 ~ EXHIBIT HB'' 
THIS DEED, made thia 8th day of Jun~, 1917, between R. 
"\Vachsman and 'Elizabeth Wachsman, his wife, parties of the 
first part, and Otto R. Wachsman, party of the second part 
all of the County of Sussex, State of Virginia. 
WITNESSETH: '];hat wh~reas, op the 1st day of March, 
1915, :a,. Waq}sma:µ and Eliz&b(3th W &chsman, his wife, under-
stood to se~ and convey to 0. R. Wachsman and his children 
the property her-einaft~;r QQpveyed by ~ df:)~d which is duly 
recorded in the Clerk's office in D B No. 23, at page 324, and 
whereas the ·said i:pstr-qwent of writing did not properly con-
vey said property therein uie11tioned and it is the intention 
~nd object of this de~d to pi•operly grant &Pd Gonvey th~ sai(j 
property whicb wa,1:1 lntendecl to be conv~y~d therein, and to 
further cance.l and declRra null and void the ~aid instrument 
of writing, d~ted on ~!.arQh 1, 1915, ~nd tg ~~~cute the follow-
ing deed; 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum 
of :five ($5,00) dollars and natural love and affection they the 
said R., ·Wachsman and his wife have for their son Otto R. 
Wachsman they the said parties of the first part do l1ereby 
bargain, sell, g·rant, and convey unto the said Otto 
page 15 ~ H. Wachsman and his children with gene11al war-
ranty of title the two f~rms known as ~obertson 
and Mount Airy containing fifteen hundred and thirteen 
( 1513) acres, more or less, bom1ded on th~ east by Nottoway 
River, south hr the land of L. P. Hargrave, west by the land 
of Ch&ppel~ and the count7 Road and on the· north by the land 
of LI Dobie and the Dobie estate. 
It is distinctly understood and agreed by and between the 
party hereto that the said Otto R. W achs~an party of the 
second part bas the right to sell all of the timber on the said 
property, and to further mortgage the said property to the 
amount of two thousand {2,000) dollars as the said Otto R. 
Wachsman deems it necessary so to do, 
Witness the following signatures and seals: 
R. WACHSMAN (Seal) 
ELIZABETH WAOHS¥A:N ($eal) 
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State of Virginia, 
County of Sussex, to-wit: 
I, W. E. Norris, a Notary Public in and for the County of 
Sussex, State of Virginia, do hereby certify that R. Wachs-
man, and Elizabeth Wachsman, his wife, whose names are 
signed to the fore going and deed bearing date on the 8th day 
of June, 1917, have each acknowledged the same 
page 16 ~ before me in my county aforesaid. 
1917. 
Given under my hand this the 22nd day of June, 
My commission expires Octo her 18th, 1920. 
Virginia: 
W. E. NORRIS, 
N ot~ry Public. 
In the Clerk's Office of Sussex Circuit Court June 27th, 
1917. 
This deed of gift from R. Wachsman & wife to Otto R. 
Wachsman was this day lodged in the said office and with the 
certificate annexed admitted to record at 3 o'clock P. M. 
Teste: 
A Copy Teste: 
Recorded in Deed Book 
No. 24 Page 560. 
R. D. NORRIS, Clerk. 
JESSE HARGRAVE, Clerk. 
EXHIBIT ''C'' 
This deed, made this 22nd day of July, 1940, by and be-
tween Mary Elizabeth Rose and George W. Rose, her hus-
band, Theresa Wachsmann, unmarried, Madonna W achsmann 
Jones and J. W. Jones, her husband, parties of the 
page 17 ~ first part, and, Rudolph Wachsman, party of the 
second part : 
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the sum 
of Three Dollars ( $3.00) cash in hand paid to the parties of 
the first part, by the party of the second part, at and before 
the ensealing and delivery of these presents, the receipt where-
of is hereby seve"rally acknowledged, and, in the further con-
sideration of the mutual love and affection the parties hereto 
bear toward each other, the said parties of the first part, do 
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hereby grant and convey, with general warranty, unto the 
said Rudolph W achsmann, all their right, title and interest, 
now and hereafter, in and to that certain property which was 
heretofore conveyed to 0. R. and his children by deed from 
R. Wachsmann and wife, dated June 8, 1917, and recorded in 
the Circuit Court Clerk's Office of Sussex County, Virginia, 
in Deed Book 24, page 560, which is therein described as fol-
lows: ·:. · · · 
'two farms,known as "Robertson'' and "Mount Airy" con-
taining fifteen lmndred and thirteen (1513) acres, more or less, 
bounded on.the east by the Nottoway River, south by the land 
of. L; P. Hargrave, west by the land of Chappell 
page 18 ~ and the county road, and north by the land of L. 
L. Dobie and Dobie Estate' 
The said grantors expressly give unto the said Rudolph 
Wachsmann, for and during his lifetime, the right to sell the 
timber from the two farms herein conveyed, and the proceeds 
therefrom shall be his separate estate. 
Witness the following signatures and seals. 
MARY ELIZABETH ROSE (Seal) 
GEORGE W. ROSE (Seal) 
THERESA WACHSMANN (Seal) 
i ' MADONNA WACHSMANN JONES (Seal) 
State of Virginia, 
County of Sussex, to-wit: 
I, Jesse Hargrave, Clerk in and for tile County and State 
aforesaid, do hereby certity that Theresa W achsmann, un-
married, :Madonna Wachsmann Jones and J. W. Jones, her 
husband, whose names are signed to the hereto-annexed writ-
ing dated July 22, 1940, personally appeared and severally 
acknowledged the same before me in my county and state 
aforesaid. 
Given under my hand this 23rd day of July, 1940. 
State of Virginia, 
County of Sussex, to-wit: 
JESSE HARGRAVE, 
Clerk Sussex County, Va .. 
I, Jesse Hargrave, Clerk in and for the County and State 
aforesaid do hereby certify that Mary Elizabeth 
page 19 ~ Rose and George W. Rose, her husband, whose 
names are signed to the foregoing hereto-annexed 
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~riting dated July 22, 19401 p~rsonally appea~ed .before me 
1Ii mr County and Stat~ af oresaiq_ and acknowledged the same. 
Given under my hartd this 8th dat of August:i 1940. 
Virginia: 
. _ JESSE HARGR~YE, 
Clerk Sussex County, Virginia~ 
In the Clerk ;s bffic~ of Suss~x Cir~uH Court August 8, 1940 . 
. - This Deed. o(tlif t and_ Quit diaim from Ma:ry ~HzabE!tli 
Rose et als. to Rudolph w achsmaiiii was thif:I day_ lodge~ irt 
the said office, and with the certificate annexed, admitted to 
recoitl at 8 6 '~lock P1 :M:. and indexed as required by law. 
Teste: 
JESSE HARGRAVE; Clerk. 
page 20 ~ And afterwards, to-wit: In the said Clerk's 
Office on t:4e 21st day of Fe.bruary, l,94~, came Otto 
R. Wachsmanrt and Margaret F. Wachsmann, Defendants, by 
their attorneys, and filed their demurrer in the words and 
:figures following: 
Virginia: 
In the ClrctiH Court of Stissex CcHihty. 
Mary W. Rose, et iii. 
v. 





The defendants Otto R. Wachsmann and Margaret F. 
W achsmann, by their attorneys, co~e and say that the bill of 
Mmplaint in this cause is not sufficient in. law and set forth 
the grounds of their demurrer to be as follows : 
1. The bili is tµuitifaritn:is irt_ tl;iat a suit by William Rudoiph 
Rose to. establi~h his all~ged claim and title to the real estate 
iii_ the bi}l a11~. ptoqee4ings desGrioe.4 is . impi'operly joined 
with f;I; suit by _Mary W. _Rose against Otto R._ Wachsm.aiin and 
llu~olph. "\f aehstnahn _£or an -~~determ_i11.-ed .s~m of money, 
there betiig' ilt:J M:tiii~ction between th~ two claims. 
2. The bill of complaint insofar as it relates to the petition 
of Mary W. Rose for additional sums of money out of the pro~ 
. . . ~ . . . . . ' . ( ,· ' .. . . . , . ' 
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~e~d·~:<Y_f::the1s~le of ti:mb~r set~ up a,state of facts which show~ 
on its face itha-t said Mary· W . .Rose- ,has. an adequate remedy 
, -:· ... : l at:law, this .being, an .action.for, money. .. . 
page 21 ~ •:. 3. T;tie bill Qf. complaint, insof a;~ as the same re~ 
1• ·: · • •. ·" lates to the claim ,of Mary W. Rose against Ru~ 
dolph :Wachsmann setting up ,a .possible mutual mistake of 
tacts, does not state facts that would. entitle the said .Mary W. 
Ro~e 1Jo relief i!l equity on the g-round of -mutual mistake. . 
·:;:4-~~The bill of complaint, -insofar, as the -same relates to the 
elaim of William Rudolph Rose that he has an interest in the 
r~al, estate in the bill and.pr9c~edj.ngs pescribed, .sh.ows on itEi 
foce that the saJd William Rudolph Rose has no interest in 
such real estate. 
OLIVER A. ·POLLARD 
WM. EARLE WHITE. 
: And afterwards, to-wit: .In the said Cierk's Office ~n the 
21st day of February; 1949. 
Virginia: 
' ... 
In the Circuit Court of Sussex County. 
. " ,, 
iI.ary.vV~ Rose and William Rudolph Rose 
. v. . . . . 
Rudolph W achsmann, Rebecca Wachsmann, Otto Wachsmann; 
Margaret F. Wachsmann, F. M.: Neblett, Rosalind Rosa 
Neblett, Gflt~wood . Sim~o.ns,. ~lp}l, Lee ·Dunn, Theresa 
Dunn, George W. Rose, Madonna Jones and John Jones, 
and Mary Jan~· Rose Simmons, George Parham Rose, Nancy 
· Margaret Ro~e, Ralph Lee Dunn, Jr., Milton Dunn; 
page 22 } Howard Wachsmann, Jean W ~chsma..n"Q.~ Marvin 
: . ~ vV a~h~m.ann .a.nil Margaret W achsmann, the last 
nine ot whom are infants. 
ANSWER. 
.. .. . ,. 
: Tpe answer of Otto Wachsmann, MBirgaret :B,. Wachsmann~ 
Rudolph WaGhs~ann, Rebec;~a ,Wachsma~n, M~donna Jones, 
John Jones, Theresa Dunn and Ralph Lee·Dunil to a certain 
bill of complaint filed against them, and· others in the Circuit 
Court of Susse~ County, Virginia-by Mary .W. Rose and Wil-
liam Rudqlph. Rose. These respondents, saving and reserving 
µnto them~elves all just exceptions to said bill of complaint; 
for answer .thereto, or to so muGh tb.ereof.a§l .. they are advised 
it is material or necessary that they should answer; answer 
and say: 
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l •. The allegations of Paragraph 1 of the bill of complaint 
are h~reby admitted to be true. . 
_ 2, _ Th~ allega~ion~ of Paragraph 2 of the bill of Complaint 
are h~reby ~dm1tted to be true. 
3. _ The allegations of Paragt·aph 8 of the bill of complaint 
are heJeby admitted to be true . 
. 4. _The al!egations of Paragraph 4(a), 4(b) afid 4(c) are 
hereby admitted to be true. 
5. For answer to the allegations of PaNigraph 5, these re· 
sponde:nts aver that if the deed from R. W achsinann and wife 
tQ Otto R, Wachsmann dated March 1, 1915; copy of which is 
filed as Exhibit A with the bill of complaint, is construed to 
create a life estate in Otto R, Wachsmailh -and a further life 
estate in his children, with the remainder to their 
page 28 ~ ~hildren~ then such de~d is void; and the deed dated 
_ . _ June 8; 1917, filed as Exhiqit B with the bill of cont• 
plaint is the only deed that defines the rights of the grantee 
t~erein, If the deed gated Mar~h 1, 1915; filed as Exhibit A 
with th~ bill of complaint be construed to grant fee simple 
title to the said Otto R .• WaohsmannJ thefi the deed dated June 
8, 1917 could have no effect because _the feo simple title was 
already vested in the· grantee named ifi said deed. 
In the deed dated March 1, 1915 nled as Exhibit A with the 
bill of complaint, be construed as vesting fee simple title in 
Otto R. Wachsmanh and his children, then living, then the 
effe~t of the deed dated Mar@ 1, 1915 would be the same as 
the effect of the deed dated June 8, 1917, because these respon-
dents say that on March 1, 1915 and Oil June 8, 1917 no grand-
children had been born to the said Otto R. W achsmann and 
his wife, Elizabeth W aclismahii, 
These respondents ther·ef ore say that in no event does the 
complainant William Rudolph Rose• nor do any of the de-
fendants who are gTandchildrefi of the said Otto R. Wachs-
mann and Elizabeth Wachsmann have any interest in the real 
estate described in the two aforesaid deeds. 
6. In answer to the allegations of PaNtg•raph 6 of the biil 
of oomplahit, these respondents say that a true ~on-
page 24 r struction of the language of the ~eed of Mar_ch 1, 
1915, as well as the language of the deed dated 
June 8, 1917, clearly gives the defendant Otto R. Waol!stnann 
the right to sell all the timber from the property. In any 
event, the present complai:nantt.3 have no right to complain 
with regard to any timber cut fro111 the property, as neither 
of them have any interest in the property. . 
7. The allegations of Paragraph 7 of the bill of complaint 
are admitted to lie true. 
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8. The all~gations of Paragraph 8 of the bill of complaint 
are hereby denied, except the allegation that the defendant, 
Otto R. Wachsmann did purchase and cause to be conveyed 
to the complainant, Mary W. Rose, the farm known as the 
Roland Place, which has a value of not less than $10,000.00 
instead of $2,700.00. The said complainant fails to mention 
that the defendant Otto R. Wachsmann has also given to the 
complainant Mary W. Rose other property, both real and per-
sonal, in consideration of love and affection. For further an-
swer to the said Paragraph 8 these respondents say that the 
said Mary W. Rose and defendant George W. Rose sought 
legal advice before sig'Iling the said deed dated July 22, 1940, 
a.nd only signed said deed after having been advised as to 
their rights in the matter. 
For further answer to said bill of complaint, your respon-
dents Theresa Dunn and Madonna Jones say that no promise 
was made to them that they should share in the 
page 25 ~ proceeds of sale of the timber from the said farms, 
and that they know of no promises made to the 
complainant Mary W. Rose at that time. 
And now having fully answered, these respondents pray 
that they be hence dismissed together with their reasonable 
costs in this behalf expended. 
OTTO WACHSMANN, 





THERESA DUNN and 
RALPH LEE DUNN 
By Counsel. 
OLIVER A. POLLARD 
WM. EARLE WHITE f. d. 
And afterwards, to-wit: In the said Clerk's Office on the 
1st day of April, 1949. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Sussex County. 
Mary W. Rose, et al. 
v. 
Rudolph W achsmann, et al. 
. ~ 
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ORDER. 
On motion of the complainants and the adult defendants in 
this cause, by their attorneys, it is ORDERED that Kinsey 
Spotswood, a competent and discreet attorney at law, be, and 
he is hereby, appointed guardian ad litem to the 
page 26 ~ infant defendants Mary Jane Rose Simmons, 
George Parham Rose, Nancy Margaret Rose, 
Ralph Lee Dunn, Jr., Milton Dunn, Howard Wachsmann, Jean 
Wachsmann, Marvin Wachsmann and Margaret Wachsmann. 
And afterwards, to-wit: In the said Clerk's Office on the 
27th day of April, 1949. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Sussex County. 
Mary W. Rose, et al. 
v. 
Rudolph Wachsmann, et als. 
ANSWER. 
THE ANSWER. OF F. M. NEBLETT, ROSALIND ROSE 
.. NEBLETT AND GATEWOOD SIMMONS TO A CER-
TAIN BILL OF COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST 
THEM AND OTHERS IN THE: CIRCUIT COURT OF 
.SUSSEX COUNTY, VIRGINIA, BY MARY W. ROSE 
AND WILLIAM RUDOLPH ROSE. 
These respondents, saving and reserving unto themselves 
all just exceptions to the said bill of complaint, for answer 
thereto, or to so much thereof as they are advised it is ma-
terial and necessary that they answer, answer and say: 
That they concur in the allegations and prayer of the said 
bill of complaint and pray that the relief therein 
page 27 ~ sought be granted insofar as the same effects the 
interests of these respondents. 
And now, having fully answered, these respondents pray 
that they be hence dismissed together with their reasonable 
costs in this behalf expended. 
F.M.NEBLETT 
ROSALIND ROSE NEBLETT and 
GATEWOOD SIMMONS 
By Counsel. 
WILLIS W. BOHANNAN f. d. . 1 
,, , . 
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. And afterw~rds, to-wit: Iri the said Clerk's Office on the 
27th day of April; 1949: 
Virginia: 
In the Chcuit Court of Sussex County. 
iiary w. Rose and William Rudolph Rose 
. . v; ., . , 
Rudt>lp4. W achsm~rin, Rebecca Wachsmann, Otto Wachsmann~ 
Margaret F. Wt:!~hs~ann,. F. M. Nebl~~t, Rosalind Rose 
Neblett, Gatewood Simmons, Ra1ph _Lee Dun~, Theresa 
Dunn, George W. Rose, Madonna Jone~ ancl John Jones; 
and Mary J: ane Rose Simmons, George Parham Rose, Nancy. 
Margaret Rose, Ralph Lee Dunn, Jr., Milton Dunn, Howard 
W achsmann, J ea11 .- W achsm~nri; M,arviri . W ac~smann and 
Margaret Wachsmann, the last nine of whom are infants. 
page 28 ~ And afterwar.ds, to-wit; ln. the said Clerk'~ 
Office dn the 27th day of April, 1949; 
Virginia: 
in the Circuit Court of Sussex Cdunty; 
Mary W. Rose, et al. 
- v. . 
Rudolph W achsmami, et als; 
• I '"'• 
.1 
• I 
THE ANSWER OF.KINSEY SPOTSWOOD, GUARDIAN 
AD LITEM APPOINTED TO DEFEND MARY JANE 
ROSE SIMMONS, ET ALS., INF ANTS IN THIS SUIT; 
IN PROPER PERSON, TO A BILL OF COMPLAINT 
FILED AGAINST THEM AND OTHERS BY MARY W; 
ROSE, ET Ah 
This respondent, reserving to himself the ~~-iie:at oi an just 
~xceptions to tpe_ said bill of complaint, for answer thereto; 
answers and says : 
. . . . . . . . . . . . ' . : ') . ;·, . ' : ' 
. That he is g1rnrdian ad litem appointed to defend the said 
Mrry ~~~e.Ros~ Simmons, Ge_orge Parh~m-~ose, Nancy Mar-
garet R9.se, Ralph Lee Dunn,_ Jr., )\!b!~on .Dunn, Howard 
W~chsmann,. Jea,n Wachsmann, Marvlil .Wach_smann an9: 
Margaret Wach~mann., i~fants,. in this suit; .that. he know~ 
nothirig df the truth or fa;lsity c,f the statements made in the 
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said bill of complaint, and he prays for the protection of the 
court for the said inf ant defendants. 
And now, having fully answered the bill of complaint, this 
respondent prays to be hence dismissed with his reasonable 
costs by him in this behalf expended. 
·KINSEY SPOTSWOOD 
Guardian ad litem of the 
named infant defendants. 
page 29} This cause, which has been regularly matured 
at rules, came on this day to be heard upon the bill 
of complaint and the exhibits therewith :filed, upon the de-
murrer of Otto R. Wachsmann and Margaret F. Wachsmann 
to said bill of complaint, upon the joint and separate answers 
of Rudolph l'v achsmann, Rebecca W achsmann, Otto Wachs-
mann, Margaret F. Wachsmann, Theresa Dunn, George W. 
Dunn, Madonna Jones and John Jones, filed at rules, upon 
the separate answers of Rosalind Rose Neblett and F. M. 
Neblett, her husband, and Gatewood Simmons, husband of 
Mary Jane Rose Simmons, this day filed by leave of court, 
upon the answer of Kinsey Spotswood, guardian ad litem 
of the inf ant defendants, Mary Jane Rose Simmons, George 
Parham Rose, Nancy Margaret Rose, Ralph Lee Dunn, Jr., 
Milton Dunn, Howard Wachsmann, Jean Wachsmann, Marvin 
. Wachsmann and Margaret W achsmann, and upon the answer 
of said defendants by their guardian ad litem this day filed 
by leave of court, upon the stipulation of counsel that the 
court in· its consideration of the demurrer aforesaid should 
take into consideration as a fact that on March 1, 1915, the 
date of the execution of the first deed from R. Wachsmann 
and Elizabeth Wachsmann, his wife, described in 
page 30 ~ Paragraph 1 of the bill of complaint, and on_ June 
2, 1917, the date of the execution of the second deed 
from R. Wachsmann and wife, described in Paragraph 2 of 
the bill of complaint, Otto R. Wachsmann had four children 
living and no grandchildren living and that no children were 
born to any of the children of Otto R. Wachsmann until the 
year 1924, and was argued by counsel: 
UPON· CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, the Court reserv-
ing for further argument the question raised by grounds 1, 2 
· and 3 of the demurrer filed as aforesaid, but being of opinion 
to sustain the fourth ground of demurrer to said bill of com-
plaint, namely, '' That the bill of complaint insofar as the 
same relates to the claim of William Rudolph Rose that he 
38 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
bas an interest in the real estate in the bill and proceedings 
described shows on its face that the same William Rudolph 
Rose bas no interest in such real estate,'' the court being of 
opinion that none of the unborn grandchildren of Otto R. 
W achmann took any interest in the real estate conveyed either 
by the deed dated March 1, 1915, from R. Wachsmann and 
wife or the deed dated June 2, 1917, from R. Wachsmann and 
wife, hereinabove ref erred to, the court doth accordingly ad.;. 
judge, order and decree that the fourth ground of the de-
murrer filed as aforesaid be, and the same is hereby, sus-
tained, and that the bill of complaint insofar as the same 
relates to the claim of William Rudolph Rose that 
page 31 ~ he and the other grandchildren of Otto R. Wachs-
mann, born or to be born to the children of the 
said Otto R. W achsmann, have an interest in the real estate 
in the bill and proceedings described, be, and the same is 
hereby, dismissed. 
It is further ordered that this cause be continued for a fur-
ther hearing on May 2, 1949, on the other three grounds of de-
murrer which relate to ~he claim of Mary W. Rose, set forth 
in Paragraph 8 of the bill of complaint. 
It is further ordered that the complainants do pay to Kin-
sey Spotswood, guardian ad litem of the infant defendants, 
a fee of $25.00, which the court doth award him for his ser-
vices in this cause. 
page 32 ~ CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, William B. Cocke, Jr., Clerk of the Circuit Court of Sus-
sex County, Virginia, do certify that the foregoing is a true 
transcript of the record in the case of Mary W. Rose, et als. 
v. Rudolph Wachsmann, et als., lately pending in said Court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up and com-
pleted and delivered until the opposing parties had received 
due notice thereof and of the intention of the parties appeal-
ing to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals for an appeal 
to the judgment therein. 
Given under my hand this 28 day of June, 1949. 
A Copy-Teste: 
W. B. COCKE, JR., 
Clerk. 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
INDEX TO RECORD 
Petition for Appeal ... 
Page 
1 
Recorcl ............................................. 20 
Bill of Complaint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
Exhibit ''A'' With Bill of Complaint-Deed, R. vVacbs-
rnan and Wife to Otto R. Waehi.;man, l\forch 1, 1915. 26 
Exhibit "B" .. With Bill of Complaint-Deed, R ·wachs-
man and Wife to Otto R,. ,vaehsman, .June 8, 1917 .. 28 
Exhibit "C" Witl1 Rill of Complaint-Dec(l, Mary Eliza-
beth Rose, &c., to Rmlolph Wachsman, ,July 22, 1940 29 
Demurrer fo Bill of Complaint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
Answer to Bill of Complaint .......................... 32 
Order Appointing Guardinn .Arl Litem ................. 35 
Answer of F. l\L N ehlett, &c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
Answer of Kinsey Spotswood, Guardian Acl Litem ...... 36 
Decree Appealed from . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
